By sourcing key intermediate goods to a potential entrant, incumbent firm can credibly and observably commit to an intense post-entry competition, thereby deter the entrant's entry. At the same time, a tacit collusion exists, and the entrant's loss from staying out of the final-good market is compensated through their sourcing transaction. We find that, there exist scenarios where entry-deterring sourcing enhances not only social welfare but also consumers' welfare, although in general it has ambiguous effect on social welfare.
1 Introduction understanding that the incumbent will fully convert its acquired intermediate good into the final good, is forced into a Stackelberg follower after its entry. Consequently, it has less incentive to practice entry. As such, by ordering no less than some threshold quantity from the entrant, the incumbent is able to keep the entrant out of the final good market. On the other side, outsourcing leads to a tacit collusion. With the entrant's entry deterred, the final good market is kept monopolized and the entry cost is avoided. Whenever the benefit of outsourcing is more than offsetting its cost, a joint surplus is generated and both firms can be better off through their sourcing transaction.
Two conditions are required for the entry-deterring outsourcing to arise in equilibrium. First, the entrant's cost disadvantage can not be too substantial, otherwise outsourcing involves a big efficiency loss and becomes suboptimal. Second, the entry cost can not be too small. If not, deterring entry requires the incumbent to outsource a huge quantity in order to commit to an aggressive enough stance upon entry. Such a huge quantity leads to a low profit in the final good market, making outsourcing unprofitable.
Although entry-deterring outsourcing implies a monopolized final-good market together with efficiency loss, it does not necessarily reduce social welfare. In fact, outsourcing can improve social welfare either due to a large entry cost saved, or due to a large quantity produced for the final good. The latter case occurs when the entrant faces a relatively small entry cost, which gives the entrant a strong incentive to enter. Thus for entry deterrence, the incumbent needs to commit to a quantity not too small. As a result, consumers' loss is moderate and can be dominated by the gain of firms, resulting in an enhanced social welfare. In fact, the aggressive stance taken by the incumbent can even benefit consumers. If the entry cost is very small hence deterring entry requires a quantity exceeding the duopoly quantity, consumers are benefited by entry-deterring outsourcing.
We do not impose exclusivity on the incumbent's make-or-buy decision. In our model, the incumbent can always outsource as well as produce the intermediate good in-house. We find that, whenever outsourcing occurs, for relatively small entry cost, the incumbent outsources exclusively to the entrant without any in-house production. Instead, for relatively large entry cost, there is a mixture in the incumbent's sourcing strategy: the incumbent outsources exactly the threshold quantity needed for entry deterrence, and produces in-house the remainder of its demand.
Our finding indicates that, everything else being equal, providers who pose a real entry threat are less likely to practice entry compared to entrants who are independent of the incumbent. It thus offers insight for a puzzling empirical finding, as shown below. Literature points out that there are good reasons for firms to beware of the entry potential of their key suppliers. Caves and Porter (1977) argue that, "important suppliers to an industry ... are often likely entry candidates". 1 However, empirical findings tell quite a different story. Smiley (1988) summarizes an extensive survey across a broad range of industries regarding what source of entry concerns them the most. One finding is, "surprisingly few firms were concerned about new entrants ...from (among) their suppliers". This finding is consistent with an arising trend nowadays that firms outsource their "core" activities including R&D in disregard of the potential that their providers might turn into fierce competitors. For example, pharmaceutical giants such as GlaxoSmithKline and Eli Lilly outsource to Asian bio-tech research companies for bringing new drug to market; Dell, Motorola and Philips are buying complete designs of some digital devices from Asian developers, although "there is a lot of great capability that has grown in Asia to develop complete products" (BusinessWeek, March 21, 2005) . While other factors could be at play, our work highlights that, the buyerseller relationship offers a channel of implicit collusion. As a result, suppliers could be less inclined to enter and compete compared to independent entrants. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 review the related literature. Section 3 gives our benchmark model and main result. Model analysis including more intuition to our result is in Section 4. Section 5 discusses our result by considering several model variations. Section 6 then concludes.
Related Literature
Our work is in line with literature where incumbent builds entry-deterring capacity to secure monopoly profit (Spence (1977) , Dixit (1979 Dixit ( , 1980 ). An easy-to-see difference between outsourcing and capacity-building in entry deterrence is that, there is no tacit collusion when the incumbent builds up capacity for entry deterrence, and the entrant is a passive player there. More implicitly, capacity built by the incumbent suffers observability problems and may totally lose its value in entry deterrence, as pointed out in previous literature (see Bagwell (1995) and Várdy (2004) ). Whereas, such observability problems are unlikely to arise with outsourcing to deter the entrant's entry. More comparison of these two strategies is given in Section 5.
Our work shares a common spirit with Gelman and Salop (1983) . In their work, the entrant pre-commits to a limited capacity of production to induce the incumbent to accommodate its entry. The findings in these two works -that by taking a less aggressive action, the entrant can share the profit with the incumbent -are qualitatively similar, although in our work there is no capacity limitation on the entrant's side. Three major differences exist between these two works. First, Gelman and Salop (1983) is on entry accommodation as there is no entry without the entrant's capacity restriction. Instead, our work is on entry deterrence as there is always entry without the incumbent's outsourcing. Second, in Gelman and Salop (1983) , it is the entrant who commits itself a soft competitor; while in our work it is the incumbent who commits itself a tough competitor after entry. Third, the "judo economy" in Gelman and Salop (1983) can be fragile when there are multiple entrants since the incumbent will find it suboptimal to accommodate several entrants. However, as discussed in Section 5, outsourcing to one entrant can establish a capacity for the incumbent which prevents multiple entrants from producing the final good. Judd (1985) shows that a multi-product incumbent may withdraw from some markets in response to entry, in order to protect its sale of substitutive goods. In Judd (1985) , the entrant makes profit in horizontally related markets by restraining its production scope among substitutive goods. Complementarily, our work illustrates that the entrant can glean profit in vertically related markets by restraining itself to upstream production.
Literature has investigated various factors which have influence on firms' sourcing deci-sion.
2
More related to our work are Baake et al. (1999) and Chen et al. (2009) , where they also recognize the endogenous leadership endowed to the buyer in outsourcing. Baake et al. (1999) examine the phenomenon where competing firms supply one another with their final products. The buyer becomes a Stackelberg leader by ordering from a competitor; at the same time, duplicate fixed cost is avoided. Chen et al. (2009) investigate the outsourcing pattern when there exist both pure suppliers and vertically integrated suppliers. When a vertically integrated producer supplies its rival, it becomes a Stackelberg follower in the final-good competition. Foreseeing such a disadvantage, it will charge a high price to drive its rival away. Our work investigates a disparate economic phenomenon. In particular, we show how the sourcing relationship facilitates a tacit collusion which makes entry deterrence desirable for both firms.
A rather sparse literature examines the viability of sourcing in entry deterrence in different contexts. Spiegel (1993) shows that when production exhibits diseconomies of scale, outsourcing to a potential entrant can enhance its future production cost therefore induce it to stay out. In our work, the occurrence of outsourcing does not rely on the strict convexity of cost. Outsourcing may arise even when production exhibits economies of scale, as shown in Section 5. Arya et al. (2008b) find that, outsourcing to a monopoly supplier pre-entry can induce the supplier to favor the entrant less in the post-entry period, hence makes entry unprofitable to the entrant. Instead, in our work the incumbent orders directly from the entrant to deter its entry.
The anticompetitive effect of vertical integration has received lots of attention in literature on vertical foreclosure (see, e.g., Salinger (1988) , Ordover et al. (1990) , Rey and Tirole (2007) ). As a complement, our work illustrates the anticompetitive effect of vertical disintegration. More related literature include Salop (1979) , on the incumbent's capability in making entry-deterring binding commitments; Aghion and Bolton (1987) , on exclusive contract and entry deterrence; Chen and Ross (2000) , on the anticompetitive effect of alliances where incumbents and entrants share production capacity.
The Model and Main Result
Firm 0 is a monopolist and firm 1 is a potential entrant for a final good F . The inverse demand of good F is given by P (Q), where Q is the total quantity of good F . For Q not too big such that P (Q) > 0, it holds that P (Q) < 0, P (Q) ≤ 0.
To produce good F requires a key intermediate good, denoted as good I. Both firm 0 and firm 1 can produce good I, and the constant marginal costs By investing a fixed fee K ≥ 0, firm 1 can acquire the same technology as firm 0 in converting good I into good F . Assume one unit of good I 2 See, e.g., Spiegel (1993) , Chen (2001) , Shy and Stenbacka (2003) , Chen et al. (2004) , Shy and Stenbacka (2005) , Van Long (2005) , Buehler and Haucap (2006) , Arya et al. (2008a,b) .
3 The linearity enables us to have a clear view of the central point. It is not critical to our analysis, though, as shown in Section 5.
4 Assuming c 1 > c 0 allows us to focus on the strategic aspect of sourcing. Our model is readily extended to the case when c 1 ≤ c 0 . If c 1 < c 0 , firm 0 is more eagerly sourcing to firm 1 for efficiency gains. Our key results will not be affected as long as c 1 is not much smaller than c 0 . If c 1 is very small, firm 1 will always enter the market of good F to drive firm 0 out and enjoy monopoly profit.
can be converted into one unit of good F . W.l.o.g, the constant average cost for producing good F is normalized to zero.
The strategic interaction between firms 0 and 1 is modelled into a three-stage game, denoted as Game Γ: and S is the total payment firm 0 pays to firm 1.
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A binding contract is signed once they reach an agreement.
Stage two. Firm 1 decides whether to enter the market of final good F by investing K.
Stage three. Firm 0 and firm 1 decide {x 0 , x 1 }, the quantity of good I to produce inside, which is unobservable to each other. If firm 1 enters, firms 0 and 1 simultaneously decide {q 0 , q 1 }, quantities of good F . If firm 1 does not enter, firm 0 chooses q 0 as a monopolist. The quantities are subject to
Game Γ is solved by backward induction for subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). Since c 1 > 0, once firm 1 enters for good F , in any equilibrium x 1 = x 1 0 + q 1 . Let δ = 1 if firm 1 enters for good F and δ = 0 if it stays out. At the terminal nodes of the game tree, profit for each firm is
Our main result to Game Γ asserts that, under certain circumstances, in SPNE firm 0 sources to firm 1 certain quantity of good I for the sole purpose of deterring firm 1's entry. Two effects of firm 0's sourcing to firm 1 work together to serve entry deterrence. First, there is a "capacity-building" effect. The outsourced quantity functions as a built-up capacity of firm 0 before firm 1's entry. As long as firm 0 produces good F within such a capacity, its marginal cost when competing with firm 1 decreases from c 0 to 0. Thus by outsourcing, firm 0 is able to commit to a more aggressive response towards entry, which raises entry barrier to firm 1. Second, there is a collusive effect. The profit in the market of good F without firm 1's entry can exceed the joint duopoly profit net of the entry cost, inducing both firms to engage in outsourcing in order to benefit from entry deterrence.
5 Our key results are well preserved when we allow for firm 1 to order good I from firm 0. See Section 5 for a discussion.
6 To focus on our central point, we consider a lump sum payment for the shipment of good I, and do not explicitly assume how firms 0 and 1 split the surplus generated by outsourcing. Our major finding persists under alternative pricing schemes, including linear pricing and two-part tariff. Section 5 gives a discussion.
7 The inequality here is equivalent to assuming free disposal of good I for both firms. I.e., no cost will occur if either firm leaves some of its acquired good I unused, without converting them into good F .
Model Analysis
In this section, we do backward induction to solve Game Γ. The SPNE of Game Γ will be fully characterized on the last step. We start from finding the Nash equilibrium (NE) quantities and profits in stage three for given sourcing decisions and entry decisions.
Stage Three
There are two cases in stage three according to firm 1's entry decision in stage two: either firm 1 has entered or it has stayed out.
Case I. Firm 1 enters for good F . In this case, firms 0 and 1 move simultaneously by choosing quantities for good F . Firm 1 maximizes Π 
8 We assume q W 1 > 0 throughout our analysis. Otherwise, firm 1 shall never enter for good F . 
In Subcase 2, firm 0 faces zero marginal cost since it produces zero amount in-house for good I. The Stackelberg leader and follower's profits for firms 0 and 1 are
The smallest q 0 at which q b 1 (q 0 ) = 0 is given by point R and denoted as q
Subcase 3 
Case II. Firm 1 stays out for good F . As a monopolist of good F , firm 0's problem is Lemma 1 There exists a unique NE in stage three.
I When firm 1 enters for good
, then firm 0 becomes a Stackelberg leader and firm 1 becomes a Stackelberg follower. We have
II When firm 1 stays out for good
Based on Lemma 1, at given {x 1 0 , S}, total equilibrium profit of each firm when firm 1 enters for good F is
Instead, when firm 1 stays out, total equilibrium profit of each firm is
We then move back to stage two to find the entry rule of firm 1.
Stage Two
W.l.o.g., we assume that if firm 1 is indifferent between entering or not, it stays out. Thus firm 1 enters for good F if and only if its post-entry profit exceeds the entry cost, i.e., π
By Lemma 1 and the continuity of π 
Notice that τ is strictly decreasing in K and c 1 since for τ < q
Throughout our following analysis, we focus on
, the range of interests. The following lemma summarizes firm 1's entry rule. (All proofs are in the Appendix.)
Lemma 2 In SPNE, firm 1 enters if and only if x
When firm 0 establishes a capacity of at least τ through sourcing to firm 1, firm 1's Stackelberg follower's profit of good F is no larger than its entry cost K. As a result, firm 1 will not enter to produce good F . The threshold capacity τ decreases in K and c 1 . The reason is, a smaller value of K or c 1 gives firm 1 a stronger incentive to enter and compete firm 0. Therefore, firm 0 needs to take a more aggressive stance towards entry in order to keep firm 1 out, which is reflected by an increase in the threshold capacity τ .
Stage One
We move back to stage one, where firms 0 and 1 discuss their sourcing transaction for good I. W.l.o.g, if both firms are indifferent between reaching an outsourcing agreement (x 1 0 > 0) or not (x 1 0 = 0), we assume that no outsourcing will take place. When firm 0 anticipates firm 1's entry, it has incentive to source to firm 1 quantity 
If outsourcing is followed by firm 1's entry, although firm 0 can be better off ordering x 1 0 > q W 0 from firm 1 to force the latter into a Stackelberg follower for good F , industry profit is reduced because the Stackelberg quantity is larger than the Cournot quantity. Therefore, at least one firm will refuse to contract in stage one in order to secure its autarky duopoly profit. As a result, no outsourcing can occur, and each firm gets the autarky duopoly profit.
Therefore, sourcing from firm 0 to firm 1 only occurs for entry-deterring purpose. Denote the industry profit without entry as ξ
). Since outsourcing leads to an efficiency loss and firms are maximizing industry profit in outsourcing, the following lemma is intuitive.
Lemma 4 In any SPNE, if firm 1 stays out for good F , it must be x
1 0 = τ . Moreover,
outsourcing arises in equilibrium if and only if
The right-hand-side of Condition (6) is the joint autarky duopoly profit net of the entry cost. Condition (6) says that outsourcing will arise in equilibrium whenever it generates a joint surplus with respect to the autarky case. Moreover, in outsourcing it must be 
Lemma 5 There existK
> 0 andc 1 > c 0 , defined bȳ K ≡ {K|ξ n (τ ) = π W 0 + π W 1 − K}, c 1 ≡ {c 1 |(c 1 − c 0 )q W 0 = π M 0 − π W 0 }.
Condition (6) holds if and only if
The intuition of Lemma 5 is spelled out below. In order to deter firm 1's entry, the smaller the value of K, the larger the quantity firm 0 needs to commit to through sourcing to firm 1. However, a large quantity can reduce the industry profit to be no larger than the joint autarky duopoly profit net of the entry cost, leading to no outsourcing. The lower bound of K for outsourcing to occur is given byK, which solves Condition (6) at equality. At K =K, industry profits are the same with and without entry deterrence.
If we fix the value of K, then outsourcing occurs if c 1 is not too big. The largest value of K leaves the largest scope of c 1 where outsourcing can occur in equilibrium. Therefore, the upper bound of c 1 for outsourcing to arise is solved from setting Condition (6) at equality while inserting K = π W 1 . In this case, firm 1 gets zero profit no matter it enters or not. To deter entry, firm 0 needs to outsource τ = q 
SPNE of Game Γ
Before we fully characterize the SPNE of Game Γ, it is useful to define
Note that by Lemma 5, Ψ = ∅ when c 1 <c
The following theorem then characterize the SPNE of Game Γ.
Our major result for c 1 ∈ [c 0 ,c 1 ) is also illustrated in Figure 2 , where K varies on the axis. To have the whole picture, we allow for K < π = τ builds up a sizable capacity for firm 0 prior to firm 1's entry, which effectively raises entry barrier to firm 1. On the other side, a tacit collusion exists. Through sharing the joint surplus generated by a more concentrated final-good market, both firms can be better off.
We then check the welfare effect of outsourcing. Consider c 1 ∈ [c 0 ,c 1 ) and K ∈ Ψ. We define social welfare as the summation of firm surplus and consumer surplus. It is clear that firms are better off under outsourcing, yet consumers may get worse off when outsourcing reduces the quantity of good F . Let us take no outsourcing as the status quo, then Q 
Outsourcing generates a distortion in social welfare, given as , τ }; and the distortion in welfare due to the change in cost structure. While the first part is positive, the second and last parts can be either positive or negative. The social welfare effect of outsourcing is in general ambiguous. There are two cases where outsourcing increases social welfare. In the first case, the entry cost is big and outsourcing enhances social welfare by preventing excessive entry. However, consumers are worse off since the quantity of good F is firm 0's monopoly quantity q M 0 , which is less than the duopoly quantity Q W . In the second case, entry cost is relatively small. To deter entry, firm 0 needs to outsource good I at a quantity relatively large, which is fully converted into good F and leads to a moderate consumers' loss. When the moderate consumers' loss together with efficiency loss are dominated by the saving of the entry cost, social welfare increases. Furthermore, consumers can even be benefited when the entry cost is sufficiently low so that deterring entry leads to a quantity larger than Q An Example. Suppose P = max{0, a − Q}, with Q = q 0 + q 1 . Assume (a + c 0 )/2 > c 1 > c 0 > 0. The first inequality is to prevent firm 0 from automatically becoming a monopolist. We can easily calculate the following values:
, firm 1 is forced into a Stackelberg follower upon its entry. Its follower's quantity for good F is solved from max
, strictly decreasing in x 1 0 . The minimum amount of x 1 0 for firm 1 to stay out is given by τ , which is solved from π
. It is verified that τ > q Figure 3 illustrates the SPNE entry strategy of the example, where parameters are set as a = 10, c 0 = 3.5. The shaded area gives the range of parameters where firm 0 outsources x 1 0 = τ to deter firm 1's entry. In the hatched area, firm 1's entry is deterred and K < π
is satisfied, implying that equilibrium quantity of good F exceeds Q W . In this area, outsourcing increases consumers' welfare. A critical assumption in our model is that firm 0's in-house production is unobservable to firm 1. Since firm 0 has strong interests in revealing its quantity to firm 1 and outsourcing is a costly method of quantity revelation, a natural question to ask is if there exists better alternatives for firm 0 to credibly reveal its quantity. First, suppose firm 0 publicly announces a big quantity of good F before firm 1's entry decision. In the lack of an outside authority which can force firm 0 to fulfill its announcement, such announcement is just "cheap talk" and is incredible to firm 1. To see this, let firm 0 announces q 0 ≥ τ before firm 1's entry. If firm 1 enters, the logic of SPNE then predicts that firm 0 will accommodate entry by producing q W 0 < τ , rather than fulfilling its announcement. In fact, any announced quantity larger than q W 0 is incredible hence will be ignored by firm 1 when making its entry decision. Therefore, a publicly announced quantity does not acquire the same commitment power for firm 0 as outsourcing does.
Second, Dixit (1980) shows that, an incumbent can build up capacity to credibly reveal its future production scale therefore restrict entry. However, previous literature points out that, if capacity is only observed with some noise, or if there is positive observation cost to the entrant, capacity built before entry may totally lose its value in entry deterrence.
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This might explain to some extent the lack of empirical evidence on capacity building as constituting an entry barrier (see, e.g., Hilke (1984) , Lieberman(1987) , Goolsbee and Syverson(2008) ). Instead, with outsourcing to deter entry, the entrant shall naturally get informed the exact quantity it is obligated to supply to the incumbent. Observability problems are unlikely to arise, especially when we take into consideration that entry deterrence through outsourcing is in both firms' interests.
Moreover, even when we assume away all these observability problems for capacitybuilding, there are scenarios where the incumbent chooses outsourcing rather than capacitybuilding to serve its purpose of entry deterrence. To see this, consider an extended game where we impose one more stage before Game Γ is played out, in which firm 0 chooses between outsourcing and building its own capacity for good I. A pre-built capacity can be expanded if firm 0 wants to produce beyond the established capacity. For comparison, we keep firm 0's total average cost for good I be c 0 under capacity-building: the constant average cost of building capacity is (1 − α)c 0 ; and the constant average cost of producing good I within the constructed capacity is αc 0 , with α ∈ [0, 1]. Figure 4 depicts the SPNE entry-deterring strategy adopted by firm 0 to the extended game. Given entry cost K, whenever α is not too small, firm 0 chooses outsourcing rather than capacity-building to deter firm 1's entry. The reason is, with capacity-building, when firm 0 produces within the established capacity, it still faces αc 0 as its marginal cost in the market of good F . Instead, with outsourcing, its marginal cost is reduced to zero. Whenever α > 0, outsourcing enables firm 0 to commit to a harsher post-entry competition upon firm 1's entry, therefore is more efficient in entry-deterrence than capacity-building. For relatively large α, the threshold capacity τ can lie beyond firm 0's commitment power if capacity-building is chosen, leaving outsourcing the only viable method of entry deterrence. 
Pure Collusion
Outsourcing leads to efficiency loss (c 1 > c 0 ) and in addition, excessive production of good F when τ > q M 0 . As these features of outsourcing leads to both firms' detriments, a pure collusion between firms 0 and 1 is appealing. However, if firm 0 does not outsource quantity τ of good I to firm 1, a pure transfer payment from firm 0 to firm 1 can not forestall firm 1 from producing good F : in stage two, firm 1 will always enter to reap its duopoly profit.
One may argue that firms could include a non-entry clause in their contract, so that firm 0 can be free of any obligations once firm 1 enters. Since c 1 > c 0 , firm 0 may order only a token amount from firm 1 if doing so help hiding the side payment hence can avoid catching attention of antitrust authorities. Nevertheless, such a collusive contract is not self-enforcing. Once firm 1 has stayed out, firm 0 lacks incentive to fulfill the side payment. While no outside authority will enforce the collusive contract, firm 1 shall enter instead of staying out for good F . Even if these two firms repeatedly interact in a dynamic setting, it is well-understood that pure collusion can be sustained in equilibrium only under certain circumstances. The merit of outsourcing in entry deterrence, therefore, in part relies with the fact that it survives backward induction and is self-enforcing.
Model Variations
We consider several model variations to gain insights on the robustness of our basic results. They include alternative pricing schemes in outsourcing, multiple potential entrants, price competition of good F , economies of scale in producing good I, and allowing firm 1 to outsource good I to firm 0.
Alternative Pricing Schemes. Our main result is well preserved with different pricing schemes in outsourcing such as linear pricing and two-part tariff. Here we only give analysis of the case when linear pricing is used. At the beginning of the game, let firm 1 announce price p at which it is willing to supply good I, then firm 0 orders x 1 0 . After that, stage two and stage three follow the same as in Game Γ.
Consider the case when firm 1 enters. Since p ≥ c 1 > c 0 , 11 firm 0 shall outsource only if by doing so it can obtain a Stackelberg leader's advantage in the future, implying that x 1 0 > q W 0 . Foreseeing its loss as a Stackelberg follower by supplying firm 0, firm 1 will set p high enough so that it can recoup its loss as a follower in the market of good F . However, the upshot is, such a high price induces firm 0 to turn to in-house production, leading to no outsourcing in equilibrium.
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Thus Lemma 3 remains unaltered, meaning that the opportunity cost of entry deterrence to firm 1 is still π W 1 − K. From firm 0's aspect, at given p, its opportunity cost of entry deterrence is either π W 0 (its profit at x 1 0 = 0), or its optimal profit when x 1 0 ∈ (q W 0 , τ ), the case when it lets firm 1 enter and then exploits its Stackelberg leader's advantage. Although the second case complicates our analysis to some extent, it has no effect on the qualitative part. Entry-deterring sourcing can again arise in SPNE, where firm 1 sets price p of good I in a way that firm 0 finds it optimal outsourcing x 1 0 = τ to deter firm 1's entry.
Multiple Potential Entrants. Suppose firm 0 faces n > 1 symmetric potential entrants, denoted as firms 1, ..., n.
First, suppose these entrants appear in sequential periods. By ordering x 1 0 = τ from firm 1 (suppose firm 1 is the first entrant to appear), firm 0 is able to deter all the entrants from producing good F . The other entrants, based on the observation that firm 0 outsources (they may not observe the exact outsourced quantity) and firm 1 chooses to stay out, understands that firm 0 has committed to a quantity large enough so that entry is no longer profitable.
Second, suppose these entrants appear at the same time and make simultaneous decisions whenever firm 1 moves in the baseline model. The solution concept to this game is sequential equilibrium. We find that, there exist multiple equilibria. In equilibrium, it can be that the incumbent accommodates all entrants, or it outsources to some of the entrants to deter their entry and let the rest enter. Nevertheless, the strategy stated in Theorem 1, combined with an appropriate belief system, constitutes a sequential equilibrium where all entrants stay out for good F . In this equilibrium, firm 0 outsources only to firm 1 quantity τ . As a result, firm 1 will not enter for good F . Each of the other entrants, believing that there is outsourcing from firm 0 to firm 1 with quantity τ , foresees that firm 0's future quantity is no less than τ hence will not enter the market of good F . Moreover, none of firms 0 and 1 wants to deviate to x 1 0 ∈ [0, τ ), as that will invite firm 1's entry. In such an equilibrium, by outsourcing to firm 1 along, firm 0 is able to deter all the entrants from producing good F .
Bertrand Competition. Our major finding in the baseline model goes through the case when firms 0 and 1 produce differentiated good F and compete in prices upon firm 1's entry. First, outsourcing x 1 0 > 0 before firm 1's entry still builds up a capacity for firm 0, which is the key element to deter firm 1's entry. Producing within the established capacity 11 Firm 1 has no incentive to set p < c 1 . If it stays out, it loses money for each unit of good I sold at a price lower than its average cost. If it enters, it may suffer as a Stackelberg follower in the market of good F when supplying firm 0, thus will never offer p < c 1 for good I. 12 The case here when firm 1 enters is similar to the setting in Chen et al. (2009) . In their setting, firm 0 can not produce good I in-house. Instead, it chooses its supplier among pure outside suppliers and firm 1, who is vertically integrated and is directly competing with firm 0 on good F . They find that, because firm 1 charges a high price of good I in order to recoup its future loss as a Stackelberg follower, outsourcing from firm 0 to firm 1 occurs in equilibrium only if firm 1 is sufficiently more efficient than outside suppliers of good I. As in our setting firm 1 is less efficient, firm 0 shall never order from firm 1.
again reduces firm 0's marginal cost from c 0 to 0 when competing with firm 1, leaving firm 0 a stronger incentive to cut its price for good F . Therefore, the outsourced quantity enables firm 0 to commit to a lower price for good F , which intensifies downstream competition and raises entry barrier. Second, the collusive effect of outsourcing persists. With firm 0 along producing good F , industry profit can exceed the joint autarky duopoly profit net of the entry cost, giving both firms incentive to sign the outsourcing contract. In fact, since price competition yields lower duopoly profit than quantity competition, the incentive for both firms to engage in entry-deterring outsourcing is even stronger under price competition.
Economies of Scale. If there are economies of scale in the production of good I, outsourcing from firm 0 to firm 1 strengthens firm 1's competency by reducing its average cost after entry, therefore may induce firm 1 to enter for good F . In light of this insight, we consider a modified game where firms' marginal cost of good I is decreasing in quantity. Suppose market demand of good F is P (Q) = max{0, a − Q}. For simplicity, assume firm 0 and firm 1 are equally efficient with the production of good I, with cost function given by
. The last inequality guarantees that production in equilibrium entails positive marginal cost. Moreover, cost function is not "too concave" so that the existence of post-entry Nash equilibrium is guaranteed. Everything else is kept the same as in the base setting.
We have two major findings to the modified game. First, in equilibrium, there exists a non-empty range of parameters where firm 0 sources to firm 1 for the purpose of deterring firm 1's entry. The main theme of our analysis to Game Γ is unaltered. Second, in entry deterrence, firm 0 always fully outsources to firm 1 its demand of good I and produces zero amount of good I in-house. Clearly, such a deviation from our findings of Game Γ is driven by firms' incentive to pursue scale economies.
Allowing Firm 1 to Outsource. In our baseline model, we rule out the possibility that firm 1 may outsource to firm 0 for good I. Clearly, firm 1 will never purchase good I whenever it stays out for good F . However, when firm 1 is entering for good F , it may order good I from firm 0 for efficiency gain. Moreover, there can be a second reason for such outsourcing, that is, to establish firm 1 as a Stackelberg leader in the market of good F .
We modify our baseline model in the following way. In stage one, firm 0 and firm 1 negotiate their transaction on good I in terms of {x We find that, given that firm 1 enters for good F , in equilibrium firm 1 fully outsources its demand of good I to firm 0, and
Each firm ends up producing the autarky duopoly quantity, implying that only efficiency gain can be achieved for firm 1 through its outsourcing. Allowing firm 1 to source to firm 0 thus increases the opportunity cost of entry deterrence from π
Entrydeterring outsourcing from firm 0 to firm 1 still arises in SPNE, but is within a smaller range of parameters given by the following condition:
It can be shown that as long as c 1 <c 1 wherec 1 ∈ (c 0 ,c 1 ), there exists a non-empty range of K which satisfies Condition (7). In this range of K, firm 1 always enters without firm 0's outsourcing. However, in SPNE firm 0 outsources x 1 0 = τ to have firm 1's entry deterred.
Conclusion
We examine the role of sourcing in entry deterrence in a setting where the potential entrant is able to provide key intermediate goods. We find that, incumbent of final good may order the intermediate good from the entrant for the sole purpose of preventing the latter from producing the final good. Two strategic effects exist with outsourcing. First, the outsourced amount commits to the incumbent's quantity of the final good, hence functions as an entrydeterring capacity of the incumbent. Second, an implicit collusion exists, where firms utilize outsourcing to keep the final-good market monopolized. These strategic elements can lead outsourcing to occur even when the entrant is costlier with the intermediate good production, as long as its cost disadvantage is not too severe.
We have exogenously assumed in our model a critical timing, namely, the quantity to outsource is determined before the entrant's entry decision. In fact, this timing can arise endogenously if we allow the entrant to choose either to make its entry decision prior to or following the incumbent's sourcing decision. It can be shown that, once outsourcing is negotiated after the entrant's entry, no outsourcing can occur and each firm ends up with its autarky duopoly profit. Therefore, whenever outsourcing arises in our base setting, it is the case that the entrant will choose to put off its entry decision until they finish the sourcing negotiation, so that it can benefit from entry deterrence.
Our model is readily extended to the case when a final-good producer lacks comparable ability in producing the intermediate good and is choosing among multiple suppliers. Our finding stresses that, an intermediate good supplier, by developing its entry potential for the final good, may acquire a competitive edge hence win the upstream competition. However, many factors are missing in our simple setting which could affect our major finding. To highlight the anticompetitive effect of sourcing of our central interests, we have ruled out the possibility that outsourcing is accompanied by technology leakage, which could directly build the entrant's entry potential. For example, the buyer may need to teach the seller related technique in order to guarantee high-quality supply.
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Besides, our finding is derived in a static setting. In a dynamic framework, an originally innocent supplier may gradually accumulate its technique know-how and innovate a superior final good through supplying the incumbent. However, it can also be the case that, repeated interaction between incumbent and entrant in the long run facilitates a higher degree of collusion, leading to even less entry. All these factors, including the technology leakage and the sustainability of long-run collusion through outsourcing, are interesting future research.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2. By Lemma 1, if
, below which entry is profitable for firm 1. We have τ (π
Proof 
At least one firm can be strictly better off with the other firm no worse off, again a contradiction. 
The first inequality follows (5); the second inequality follows (5), the strict concavity of profit, and τ > q 
(by (5) and F 1, F 2) 
